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    <div class="moz-cite-prefix">Why provide a proxy that ultimately
      does nothing?  Just don't use IPSec on the devices that can't
      support it, and accept the situation.<br>
      <br>
      --Bart<br>
      <br>
      <br>
      On 02/22/2013 02:17 PM, Benjamin Krueger wrote:<br>
    </div>
    <blockquote
cite="mid:CAMcW5DqGGwx39s_T0YaYyj4WCmjh3oMtqjwXV-h=oeYV75pjSg@mail.gmail.com"
      type="cite">
      <div dir="ltr">I suspect that for those kinds of devices, we would
        do well to provide them with a proxy service they can use. It
        won't have any integrity guarantees, but as long as they
        understand that they it should be ok.</div>
      <div class="gmail_extra"><br>
        <br>
        <div class="gmail_quote">On Fri, Feb 22, 2013 at 7:03 AM, steve
          monsey <span dir="ltr"><<a moz-do-not-send="true"
              href="mailto:stevewa206@gmail.com" target="_blank">stevewa206@gmail.com</a>></span>
          wrote:<br>
          <blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0
            .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
            <div dir="auto">
              <div>Yes, that is how a lot of organizations use it. One
                of the issues is with small gadgets that do not have
                that much sophistication in their OS. An echo link
                gadget probably does not have the facility to do a
                certificate.  <span class="HOEnZb"><font color="#888888"><br>
                    <br>
                    Steve</font></span></div>
              <div>
                <div class="h5">
                  <div><br>
                    On Feb 22, 2013, at 1:30 AM, Benjamin Krueger <<a
                      moz-do-not-send="true"
                      href="mailto:ben.krueger@gmail.com"
                      target="_blank">ben.krueger@gmail.com</a>>
                    wrote:<br>
                    <br>
                  </div>
                  <blockquote type="cite">
                    <div>
                      <div dir="ltr">This would work fine as well.</div>
                      <div class="gmail_extra"><br>
                        <br>
                        <div class="gmail_quote">On Fri, Feb 22, 2013 at
                          12:14 AM, Cory (NQ1E) <span dir="ltr"><<a
                              moz-do-not-send="true"
                              href="mailto:cory@nq1e.hm" target="_blank">cory@nq1e.hm</a>></span>
                          wrote:<br>
                          <blockquote class="gmail_quote"
                            style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px
                            #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">
                            <div dir="ltr">When you use someone's public
                              key to establish a secure connection with
                              them, you need a way to verify that it
                              belongs to the party you intend and not
                              an imposer.  One way to do that is to make
                              the public keys available ahead of time
                              via a trusted source (such as DNSSEC).
                               However, certificates are an alternative
                              way of doing that without communicating in
                              advance or with any other online system.
                               Each party trusts one or more root
                              certificate authorities and the CAs vouch
                              for someone by signing their public key.
                               Each host knows that "if the root trusts
                              who I'm talking to, they must be legit".
                               A certificate is simply a public key with
                              identifying information which is then
                              signed by a trusted third party.
                              <div>
                                <br>
                              </div>
                            </div>
                            <div>
                              <div>
                                <div class="gmail_extra"><br>
                                  <br>
                                  <div class="gmail_quote">On Thu, Feb
                                    21, 2013 at 10:33 PM, Benjamin
                                    Krueger <span dir="ltr"><<a
                                        moz-do-not-send="true"
                                        href="mailto:ben.krueger@gmail.com"
                                        target="_blank">ben.krueger@gmail.com</a>></span>
                                    wrote:<br>
                                    <blockquote class="gmail_quote"
                                      style="margin:0 0 0
                                      .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc
                                      solid;padding-left:1ex">
                                      <p dir="ltr">The problem isn't
                                        generating keys and
                                        certificates, but distributing
                                        them so that hosts which are
                                        strangers have a way to
                                        authenticate each other. So far
                                        dnssec looks like a candidate.
                                        Check out the rfc for
                                        opportunistic encryption (rfc
                                        4322).</p>
                                      <div>
                                        <div>
                                          <p dir="ltr">On Feb 21, 2013
                                            8:31 PM, "Cory (NQ1E)" <<a
                                              moz-do-not-send="true"
                                              href="mailto:cory@nq1e.hm"
                                              target="_blank">cory@nq1e.hm</a>>
                                            wrote:<br>
                                            ><br>
                                            > IPSec(AH) is a great
                                            solution for protecting the
                                            availability of services on
                                            the network.  Unfortunately,
                                            it does nothing to protect
                                            layers 1 and 2 (the more
                                            important ones to the RF
                                            rules).  Arguably, only
                                            having layer 2 access to a
                                            node will not get you very
                                            much, but it's worth noting.
                                             Because of this 802.1x will
                                            likely be the way to go and
                                            I'm currently investigating
                                            the details of what it would
                                            look like for our specific
                                            use case. Short of
                                            customizing the RF spec,
                                            there's not really much else
                                            we could do at the lower
                                            layers.<br>
                                            ><br>
                                            > Regarding key exchange,
                                            it turns out that the ARRL
                                            already has a PKI trust
                                            infrastructure in place.
                                             The ARRL Logbook of the
                                            World service requires that
                                            hams jump though hoops to
                                            prove their licence identity
                                            and it issues them a
                                            certificate with their call
                                            sign when they do.<br>
                                            ><br>
                                            > The certificates are
                                            intended to be used for
                                            signing logbook entries, but
                                            if you know what you're
                                            doing, there's nothing that
                                            would prevent you from
                                            exporting the key pair and
                                            using it for other things.
                                             A server that trusts the
                                            ARRL root CA certificate
                                            would be able to prove the
                                            identity and call sign of
                                            any user connecting to it
                                            with such a user cert.  I
                                            setup a test server for this
                                            a while back and it's still
                                            up and running at <a
                                              moz-do-not-send="true"
                                              href="https://mutual.hamauth.com/"
                                              target="_blank">https://mutual.hamauth.com/</a>
                                             If you have such a cert and
                                            imported it into your
                                            browser, you could try it
                                            out.  I also have one
                                            running at <a
                                              moz-do-not-send="true"
                                              href="https://tls-test.nq1e.hm/"
                                              target="_blank">https://tls-test.nq1e.hm/</a>
                                            that you may not be able to
                                            connect to because it's also
                                            using the little known null
                                            (no) encryption cipher spec
                                            in SSL which browsers don't
                                            support by default (it can
                                            be enabled in firefox or
                                            opera).  This means that if
                                            the client was properly
                                            configured, we could use SSL
                                            servers for specific
                                            services on the wireless
                                            network for authentication,
                                            authorization and integrity
                                            without encryption.<br>
                                            ><br>
                                            > The same rsa key pair
                                            can use used for SSH auth as
                                            well, but from my
                                            investigations, it would
                                            require custom binaries on
                                            both the client and server
                                            side to disable the
                                            encryption.<br>
                                            ><br>
                                            > It's a cumbersome
                                            hurdle that we wouldn't want
                                            to make people jump through,
                                            but if it were more popular,
                                            it could be used for just
                                            about anything.  You should
                                            all definitely sign up for
                                            LotW just in case (since it
                                            can take a week or two to
                                            get verified).  ;)<br>
                                            ><br>
                                            > -Cory<br>
                                            > *infosec geek*<br>
                                            ><br>
                                            ><br>
                                            ><br>
                                            > On Thu, Feb 21, 2013 at
                                            7:21 PM, Benjamin Krueger
                                            <<a
                                              moz-do-not-send="true"
                                              href="mailto:ben.krueger@gmail.com"
                                              target="_blank">ben.krueger@gmail.com</a>>
                                            wrote:<br>
                                            >><br>
                                            >> I think we can
                                            solve a lot of our
                                            crypto-regulation problems
                                            if we explore IPSec in
                                            Authentication Header
                                            Transport mode. This signs
                                            every IP packet which gets
                                            us connection integrity,
                                            origin authentication, and
                                            replay protection without
                                            encrypting anything. Then we
                                            only have to take very basic
                                            measures to ensure folks
                                            don't intentionally or
                                            unintentionally make
                                            encrypted connections (over
                                            SSL, SSH, or other commonly
                                            encrypted protocols). The
                                            only outstanding question
                                            then is how to handle IKE
                                            (key exchange) in an
                                            automated way with
                                            certificates.<br>
                                            >><br>
                                            >> I'm going to speak
                                            to some infosec geeks about
                                            this tonight<br>
                                            >><br>
                                            >> NB: This doesn't
                                            handle initial network
                                            access authentication.
                                            That's still a problem to be
                                            solved, possibly with
                                            802.1X, though that has its
                                            own problem since RouterOS
                                            only supports TLS-EAP which
                                            incorporates crypto.<br>
                                            >><br>
                                            >> -- <br>
                                            >> Benjamin<br>
                                            >><br>
                                            >>
                                            _______________________________________________<br>
                                            >> PSDR mailing list<br>
                                            >> <a
                                              moz-do-not-send="true"
                                              href="mailto:PSDR@hamwan.org"
                                              target="_blank">PSDR@hamwan.org</a><br>
                                            >> <a
                                              moz-do-not-send="true"
                                              href="http://mail.hamwan.org/mailman/listinfo/psdr_hamwan.org"
                                              target="_blank">http://mail.hamwan.org/mailman/listinfo/psdr_hamwan.org</a><br>
                                            >><br>
                                            ><br>
                                            ><br>
                                            >
                                            _______________________________________________<br>
                                            > PSDR mailing list<br>
                                            > <a
                                              moz-do-not-send="true"
                                              href="mailto:PSDR@hamwan.org"
                                              target="_blank">PSDR@hamwan.org</a><br>
                                            > <a
                                              moz-do-not-send="true"
                                              href="http://mail.hamwan.org/mailman/listinfo/psdr_hamwan.org"
                                              target="_blank">http://mail.hamwan.org/mailman/listinfo/psdr_hamwan.org</a><br>
                                            ><br>
                                          </p>
                                        </div>
                                      </div>
                                      <br>
_______________________________________________<br>
                                      PSDR mailing list<br>
                                      <a moz-do-not-send="true"
                                        href="mailto:PSDR@hamwan.org"
                                        target="_blank">PSDR@hamwan.org</a><br>
                                      <a moz-do-not-send="true"
                                        href="http://mail.hamwan.org/mailman/listinfo/psdr_hamwan.org"
                                        target="_blank">http://mail.hamwan.org/mailman/listinfo/psdr_hamwan.org</a><br>
                                      <br>
                                    </blockquote>
                                  </div>
                                  <br>
                                </div>
                              </div>
                            </div>
                            <br>
_______________________________________________<br>
                            PSDR mailing list<br>
                            <a moz-do-not-send="true"
                              href="mailto:PSDR@hamwan.org"
                              target="_blank">PSDR@hamwan.org</a><br>
                            <a moz-do-not-send="true"
                              href="http://mail.hamwan.org/mailman/listinfo/psdr_hamwan.org"
                              target="_blank">http://mail.hamwan.org/mailman/listinfo/psdr_hamwan.org</a><br>
                            <br>
                          </blockquote>
                        </div>
                        <br>
                        <br clear="all">
                        <div><br>
                        </div>
                        -- <br>
                        <div dir="ltr">Benjamin<br>
                        </div>
                      </div>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                  <blockquote type="cite">
                    <div><span>_______________________________________________</span><br>
                      <span>PSDR mailing list</span><br>
                      <span><a moz-do-not-send="true"
                          href="mailto:PSDR@hamwan.org" target="_blank">PSDR@hamwan.org</a></span><br>
                      <span><a moz-do-not-send="true"
                          href="http://mail.hamwan.org/mailman/listinfo/psdr_hamwan.org"
                          target="_blank">http://mail.hamwan.org/mailman/listinfo/psdr_hamwan.org</a></span><br>
                    </div>
                  </blockquote>
                </div>
              </div>
            </div>
            <br>
            _______________________________________________<br>
            PSDR mailing list<br>
            <a moz-do-not-send="true" href="mailto:PSDR@hamwan.org">PSDR@hamwan.org</a><br>
            <a moz-do-not-send="true"
              href="http://mail.hamwan.org/mailman/listinfo/psdr_hamwan.org"
              target="_blank">http://mail.hamwan.org/mailman/listinfo/psdr_hamwan.org</a><br>
            <br>
          </blockquote>
        </div>
        <br>
        <br clear="all">
        <div><br>
        </div>
        -- <br>
        <div dir="ltr">Benjamin<br>
        </div>
      </div>
      <br>
      <fieldset class="mimeAttachmentHeader"></fieldset>
      <br>
      <pre wrap="">_______________________________________________
PSDR mailing list
<a class="moz-txt-link-abbreviated" href="mailto:PSDR@hamwan.org">PSDR@hamwan.org</a>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://mail.hamwan.org/mailman/listinfo/psdr_hamwan.org">http://mail.hamwan.org/mailman/listinfo/psdr_hamwan.org</a>
</pre>
    </blockquote>
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